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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 900592 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY 
Questar Pipeline Company (Questar) respectfully submits its reply brief in 
response to the brief of respondent Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission), 
filed June 20, 1991. 
INTRODUCTION 
The thrust of Questar's request for review of the action of the Tax Com-
mission is that it seeks a fair and lawful evaluation of the fair market value (FMV) 
of its property, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6) (1987) As set 
forth in its Opening Brief (the "Questar O.B."), Questar believes the Commission 
has reached a company-wide evaluation of $296 million by means that do not 
comport with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and applicable case law. 
The Commission's responsive brief does not overcome the fundamental shortcom-
ings of the Commission's original December 3, 1990, order: The order does not 
meet minimal standards of arriving at rational conclusions from the evidence and 
the applicable law, nor does it provide a perceptible line of reasoning by which 
the taxpayer and the reviewing court can evaluate the Commission's final $296 
million evaluation. 
I. THE THEORY ADVANCED IN THE COMMISSION BRIEF 
WOULD PERMIT NEARLY UNBRIDLED AGENCY 
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE TAXPAYERS' LIABILITY 
IN THE NAME OF "EXERCISING JUDGMENT" 
The real foundation of the Commission's Brief is found on pages 36-43, 
where it argues that the final determination of property value from the various 
methods under the consideration is a matter of the Commission's judgment. 
Questar does not contest the legal principle of according the Commission some 
deference to the expertise it has in specialized, technical areas. On the other 
hand, the position advanced in its brief would, in the name of judgment and 
agency expertise, give carte blanche to the Commission to assign nearly any num-
ber to the taxpayer's property as long as some witness alluded to a range of values 
containing the number. Questar does not believe the UAPA and applicable case 
law is so permissive. 
A. Standards Under the Milne and Mountain States Legal Foundation Cases. 
The Commission seems unwilling to recognize that it must treat taxpayers 
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in a way that is accountable. This Court has pointedly addressed this principle in 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378-79 (Utah 1986), and Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation v. PSC, 636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981). In those 
cases the Court established that state agencies must provide those they regulate 
and the reviewing courts not only with findings of ultimate facts, but findings of 
all material subordinate factual issues.1 
The Court stated in Mountain States, and reaffirmed in D and H Real 
Estate Co. v. PSC, 784 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1989): 
To enable this Court to determine whether an order is arbitrary and 
capricious, the Commission must make findings of fact that are 
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the Court of the basis 
for the Commission's decision . . . . 
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings must be suffi-
ciently detailed to demonstrate that the Commission has properly 
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and has properly applied the 
governing rules of law to those findings. 
The Milne case elaborates on the obligations of an agency to provide reasoned 
decision-making: 
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory responsibilities 
without making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues 
under the governing statutory standards. It is also essential that the 
Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the 
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in 
such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis 
Although these are pre-UAPA cases, the principles of agency accountability 
that are discussed are at least as strongly applicable under the UAPA as under 
former agency-review standards. See Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. 
Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 443 n.6 (Utah App. 1990). 
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for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete, accurate, 
and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper determination 
by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should be suffi-
ciently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached . . . . 
Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of review-
ing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal 
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary 
and capricious administrative action. 
720 P.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). In some ways, the Milne case is similar to 
the case currently before the Court. As did the Public Service Commission in 
Milne, the Tax Commission has made findings only on the barest of ultimate 
issues—here, the ultimate evaluation of $296 million—and has failed to provide 
"subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues 
are highlighted and resolved." As Questar has argued in its opening brief and in 
this reply brief, the Commission's actions do not provide "complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact . . . essential to a proper determination" of FMV. 
B. Commission "Judgment" Has Not Addressed Subordinate Factual Issues. 
Any fair and reasonable analysis of the evidence must come to grips with 
the financial realities facing a rate-regulated company such as Questar. Quite 
simply, the Commission has not disposed of pivotal subordinate issues either in its 
final order or in its brief. In the context of Milne and Mountain States, the Com-
mission never explained such fundamental matters as: 
1. How is it possible for Questar's FMV to be 41% higher than the rate-
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base/cost value2 placed on the Company by the rate-regulating agency for pur-
poses of producing a rate of return to investors that is comparable to other invest-
ments of comparable risk?3 
Given that Questar's revenue and income stream are wholly determined by 
the ratemaking procedures of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the 
"cost method"), what is it about this company that would induce a knowledgeable 
and willing investor/buyer to pay 41% more than the rate base on which the 
FERC has determined a just and reasonable rate of return may be earned? (See 
Questar's O.B. at 16-25.) 
The Commission's Brief still has given no answer to this question, except 
to state and restate in conclusory fashion that the Commission believes the income 
method is the most reliable method, the cost method the least reliable and that the 
stock-and-debt (market) method "tests the reliability" of the cost method. The 
sum total of the Commission's reasoning on these foundational matters is found in 
Stipulated rate-base/cost = $210 million; Commission evaluation = $296 
million. ($296 - $210) + $210 = 41%. 
3It is something of an irony that the Division of Public Utilities and the Tax 
Commission—two agencies of the same sovereign, the State of Utah—pull the 
corporate citizen in opposite directions when determining the value of the com-
pany. As an agency of the State to generate revenues, the Tax Commission has a 
bias toward increased valuation of facilities. As one of the watchdogs of ultimate 
utility rates in Utah, the Division of Public Utilities tends to take positions that 
would keep the valuation of the pipeline's assets lower—the lower the rate base, 
the lower the resultant rates. The rate-regulated taxpayer is caught in the middle. 
In a super-equitable world, one might require the State's agencies to concur be-
tween themselves what single value the State would use for both purposes. 
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two sparse paragraphs of its order (R. 9, H 8-9), which do not provide even the 
most rudimentary roadmap to its analysis of the facts and circumstances before it. 
2. How is the Commission's ultimate reliance on the income method and 
the conclusion that the stock-and-debt method is an independent "test" of the cost 
method reconciled with Prof. Hal Heaton's uncontested evidence that, except for 
minor differences, the "income" method is no more than the stock-and-debt 
method in disguise?4 (R. 65, 262, Questar O.B. at 25-29.) 
3. How did the Commission reconcile the fundamentally different ap-
proaches of the Division's witnesses to FMV? What witness, what evidence and 
what theories from the Property Tax Division's diversity of witnesses did the 
Commission rely on? For example, Prof. Hanke and Mr. Prawitt had a major 
philosophic disagreement about the applicability of the stock-and-debt method. 
(R. 201-02.) Another example: Did the Commission rely on Prof. Hanke's and 
Mr. Goodwin's totally irrelevant examples of the California houses that might 
have a market value completely different from their replacement or cost values? 
(Tr. 126, 205-06.) Since the hypothetical houses were not subject to original-cost 
ratemaking constraints, the Commission could hardly rely on this "evidence" as 
the basis for rejecting the position that the rate base for a FERC-regulated compa-
ny and its FMV are closely related. Did it? 
4For example, Prof. Hanke, who espoused total reliance on the stock-and-debt 
method, could not take issue with Prof. Heaton's demonstration. (R. 150.) 
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did it square his tenacious and implacable insistence on a $300 million evaluation 
with his disregard foi the spirit and letter of tl ic settlement framework? Mr. 
grasp 'the significance of the stipulation and that he did not consider the iagreed to 
values in the context of the stipulation.5 (See also discussion in § IV below ) 
no dispute over the formulaic detei mination of this method under FERC rate 
The following colloquy is particularly revealing (R. 161-62): 
Q Nov , our [Questar's] case was that m e were given the 
three i lumbers, arid w e agreed K it'll the Property Tax Division three 
numbers, 210, 303, and. 312, to form the basis of some sort of a 
composite result. We engaged an expert witness to make an analysis 
of that process with those numbers and [he] came up with a rela-
tively narrow range. Now, we presumefd] that the Property Tax 
Division would do exactly the same thing . [, , To] take those three 
numbers as given numbers and through some; procedure that is de 
scribable and can. be looked at, would find a correlated value that's 
consistent with the Property Tax Division's approach to correlation, 
generally. Did you do that? 
Did I do what? I Hunk I missal I he question •" 
Did you take these three numbers and forget about where they 
come from and decide what was the relative reliability from your 
point of view and derive a correlated value, a weighted value? 
If you 're talki ng about the $292 million value? 
I" Jo, I'lii talking about Column D [of Exhibit 1.] 
Did I, or can I? • • 
Did you? 
I I ;:: III: na e not . . . . 
regulation? Indeed, it is the least subjective of the methods because of its regula-
tory origin. (R. 75-76, 102.) 
The Commission's answer to its failure to address these and other subordi-
nate factual issues and to provide a logical chain of reasoning is its theory that the 
Court should defer to its conclusory "judgment" of the ultimate factual issue and 
that "[v]aluation is an art, not a science." (Commission Brief at 41.) Merely 
characterizing its tax-assessment obligations as an "art" does not allow the Com-
mission to escape accountability for the results it imposes. A two-paragraph state-
ment of conclusions does not measure up to requirements of Milne, Mountain 
States and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) and (h) (1989). 
C. There Is No Rational Explanation of the Choice of a FMVof$296 Million. 
In its Brief (page 43), the Commission argues that the record supports the 
finding of a $296 million FMV because it is "squarely within the range of value 
proffered by the Property Tax Division" and that "it should be enough to simply 
choose a value with[in] the range of values presented to the Commission." No 
legal authority is cited for this claim to an extraordinarily broad license. 
First, to "simply choose a value" does not allow the taxpayer and the Court 
to evaluate whether there are rational chains of logic and reasoning and findings of 
subordinate facts to determine if the Commission has been arbitrary and capri-
cious. Milne, 720 P.2d at 1378. The Commission's claim that a value picked out 
of a range of values discussed by witnesses at the hearing satisfies the UAPA's 
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substantial-evidence test seriously misconstrues the standard. Because the ultimate 
subordinate facts that 'the Commission never addressed, "the Commission 's action 
cannot be sustained.6 
S e i • o i in , I 11 in i • III" 1 1 1 1 | M • i II i, III i in ii 1 > ii \' i ' , i i i » i in ii 1 1 1 1 in I 1 1 1 1 " m i l n mi ' i in mi in i| ill 11 in in ,i Il  II 11 ii i mi in II "I, 
Division witi less who discussed actual values was Mr . Praw itt, who stated direct-
'•• squarely in the face of changes in the methods ' values over the course of the 
eeilinp, ill I Ii "IIIINIII . n l III / 
T I U U J S , ( R . 1' 71 9 7 . ) O ' l i l ) oi i soi ne follow (uestioning from Commissionei 
D.iiis did he allow Iktl uthc value could be befwu.'ii $290 and $310, < » 
\\)W In ii. II IUMIII'I ii- I \ i laiipiusLS added].) 
Still, the Commission apparently has relied on Mi Prawitt 's testimony -
since n: ici othei witness except Pi of I leaton made any concrete recommendation 
nn a witne<^ whose K. testimony on the correlation 
xhibited ipiilated 
facts and a logically inconsistent: approach to the anal) "sis that could not b I 
upon by a reasonable fact i inder. 
6 There is nothing in the order to distinguish the Commission 's claimed exer-
cise of judgment from simply accepting, without question, its s taffs recommenda-
tion. See, e g , Mountain Fuel Supply Co, v. PSCf 662 P.2d 878, 887-88 (Wyo. 
1983) (coin t couldn't discern whether PSC 'had automatically, uniformly, and 
unlawfully adopted its staffs recommendations on the utilities9 rates of return, 
independent of the evidence). 
_9_ 
The point is not that the Commission must pick one number that was 
testified to by a specific witness, but that it must exercise its responsibility to 
assess the record as a whole and arrive at subordinate and ultimate conclusions by 
rational and discernable means, applying the law to all the evidence before it. 
This, Questar believes, the Commission has not done. 
The fundamental problem with the Commission's claim of license to engage 
in judgment and art is that it camouflages arbitrary and capricious actions. The 
essence of the Commission's arguments on pages 36-43 of its Brief is that it has 
essentially free rein to choose nearly any value for the FMV so long as one of its 
staff or their retained witnesses testifies to a range that includes the final number. 
No reasonable administrative review standard should allow this liberty, much less 
the more stringent review standards adopted by the Utah Legislature—the UAPA. 
D. Standard of Review 
Although Questar believes that the Commission action is sufficiently defec-
tive that it would not have passed the tests of lawfulness under the pre-UAPA 
statutory framework, the UAPA—with its wider grant to the Court to consider 
evidence "when viewed in light of the whole record"—provides the standard of 
review for this case, which was initiated after January 1, 1988. 
The Commission Brief (page 46), on the other hand, urges the Court to 
apply the standards articulated in Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. 
Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990), and a previ-
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ous case cited in Vali, USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah 
App. 1989). Both cases are pre-UAPA cases, and the standards articulated and 
discussed there are not directly applicable to the case before the Court. Judge 
Orme points this out in Vali by noting that "somewhat less deference is accorded 
in connection with the review of an agency's factual determinations when the 
Administrative Procedures Act is applicable." 797 P.2d at 443 n.6. 
Even weaker is the Commission's urging on the same page of its brief that 
the Court adopt the review standards discussed by the Washington intermediate 
appeals court in cases that did not involve statutory provisions that are equivalent 
to the UAPA. 
II. WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS MARSHALLED, 
THE COMMISSION'S $296 MILLION EVALUATION 
DOES NOT PASS THE APPLICABLE UAPA TESTS 
As the Commission Brief correctly points out (page 10), this Court and the 
Court of Appeals have required parties who believe that agency decisions are not 
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole to "mar-
shall the evidence" to make such a showing. First National Bank of Boston v. 
County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Grace Drilling 
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). But, no matter how 
much evidence is marshalled in this proceeding, the words of the Bank of Boston 
opinion apply here: "Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission 
arrived at the figures" that the Commission chose as the FMV of Questar's 
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system. 
Further, Questar does not believe that the Bank of Boston case stands for 
the proposition that the raw quantity of evidence automatically satisfies the sub-
stantial-evidence test. If that were the case, there would be no place for consider-
ations of quality of the evidence. To put it another way, the Commission's theory 
of substantial evidence would not take account of questions of logical consistency, 
the reasonableness of the conclusions and the applicability of the law, as required 
implicitly by the UAPA and explicitly by cases such as Milne, Mountain States 
and Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) (questions of 
mixed fact and law subject to a "reasonableness standard").7 
As discussed in more detail in Questar's Opening Brief, (1) it is not clear 
what evidence the Commission's December 3, 1990, decision relied on, and (2) 
any rational evaluation of the evidence, when the record is considered as a whole, 
would not pass a reasonableness test. The latter observation obtains if for no 
other reason than the result does not account for the enormous disparity between 
the Commission's $296 million evaluation and the $210 million investment base 
on which the Company's revenue and income streams are determined on a just-
and-reasonable basis by the FERC. 
7Hurley is a pre-UAPA case, but the mixed-law-and-fact standard is still 
applicable in the UAPA framework. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Re-
view, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah App. 1989). 
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III. THE COMMISSION BRIEF'S DISCUSSION OF THE 
COST METHOD FURTHER CONFIRMS THE UNLAWFULNESS 
OF ITS APPARENT REJECTION OF ITS USE 
The substantive argument in the Commission Brief commences with what 
purports to be a discussion of the cost method, but immediately proceeds totally to 
mischaracterize the cost method used in the proceeding as the replacement cost: 
"what it would cost for a willing buyer to reconstruct the subject property." 
Commission Brief at 13 (emphasis added). How can the taxpayer or this Court 
feel that the taxpayer has been subjected to a fair, impartial and knowledgeable 
evaluation of the evidence when one of the premier issues—the role of the depre-
ciated original cost (rate base) evaluation, the "cost method"—is treated with 
such carelessness in the Commission's Brief? If the Commission gave no more 
consideration to the merit of the cost-method arguments than is indicated by the 
treatment in its brief, then its claims that it "properly considered all evidence and 
gave all due thought and consideration to Questar's arguments and experts' opin-
ions"8 ring hollow indeed. 
If the issue had been whether the Commission should place primary weight 
on the value of reconstruction costs, then the Commission's rejection of the cost 
method would be justifiable; Questar would agree that there is relatively little 
nexus between that value and FMV for an original-cost rate-base-regulated inter-
Commission Brief at 45. 
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state pipeline. 
But, of course, that was never the issue. Replacement or reconstruction 
cost was never discussed in the proceedings. To the extent the Commission's 
Brief represents its understanding of the issue and rejection of the rate-base /cost 
method as unreliable, the Commission has made an error of the first magnitude. 
If not, it does not speak well of the Commission's care in treating the issues that 
have brought the parties before the Court. 
Apparently in support of this erroneous definition of the cost method used 
in the case, the Commission's Brief (page 13) then cited a case that squarely sup-
ports Questar's position that FMV appraisals of rate-regulated companies must 
focus on the fact that companies whose rates and income streams are strictly 
constrained to produce a return on utility-type rate base. Pacific Power & Light 
Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 308 Or. 49, 775 P.2d 303 (1989), found that the rate-
base /cost method was a reasonable measure of FMV. The Oregon Supreme 
Court's qualitative analysis (in a de novo review) is particularly instructive, be-
cause it was faced with a central-assessment case similar to the one before this 
Court. Contrary to the Utah Tax Commission's summary dismissal of the rate-
base/cost method as the "least reliable" of the three methods, the Oregon court 
looked at the clear connection between the HCLD9—i.e., the rate base—and 
9HCLD: Historic cost less depreciation—the "cost approach," derived from 
the utility's annual report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Id. at 
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FMV to conclude: 
Accepting that . . . what we are searching for is what a hypothetical 
willing buyer of this property would pay to a hypothetical willing 
seller, it seems clear to us that a willing buyer of the plant and 
equipment would be agreeable to paying a figure close to HCLD, 
because the buyer could then earn off all that expenditure. 
A weight of 45% was assigned to the cost method in the Oregon case.10 It is 
significant that specific weights were assigned so that the actual "correlated" value 
could be determined from the three individual components. Id. at 312. 
This is contrary to the Utah Tax Commission's approach of refusing to 
state weighting factors for the methods, depending on its judgment to divine a 
proper FMV. According to the Commission, "no 'weighting' formula is re-
quired, " notwithstanding that it never addressed the issue of "the moving target." 
Commission Brief at 45. Compare discussion in Questar O. B. at 33-40. See 
also, e.g., Wyo. Tax Comm'n Rules and Regs., ch. XXII, § 14(c): "Any tax-
payer . . . , upon request, will be provided with . . . [t]he relative weight as-
signed to each of the methods if more than one is used and an explanation of the 
weighting used." 
307. This is the same rate base used in the Questar case. 
10Although the specific choice of 45% is not particularly significant here 
because no party contested the percentages, the court's analysis confirmed that a 
substantial weight should be given to this rate-case evaluation method. If the issue 
had been contested, it is hard to speculate whether the Oregon Supreme Court 
would have attached a weight higher than 45% on the basis of its finding that 
investors are obviously limited by the rate base (HCLD). 
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It is also notable that the Oregon court's qualitative analysis of the cost 
method for an FERC-regulated company went on to observe that there was record 
evidence "to the effect that regulation to some extent diminishes the earning poten-
tial of regulated property and, therefore, a willing buyer would wish to discount 
the property to some degree." Id. This, of course, was dictum in the Pacific 
Power decision, but it illustrates the intuitive understanding of the constraints 
placed on an investor/buyer and further illustrates that the Utah Commission's 
summary disposal of the cost method is an abuse of its discretion. 
Finally, as a minor but indicative point, the Commission Brief—presumably 
in rationalizing its minimal use of the cost method—states that Questar's FMV is 
"more accurately measured by the income method and the stock and debt method 
since both of these methods are market based." Commission Brief at 4 (emphasis 
added). This is simply not correct. The income method is not market-based, and 
no witness so testified.11 This is another example of Commission carelessness 
with the evidence. 
IV. ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH IN THE COMMISSION 
BRIEF EVIDENCE A MISUNDERSTANDING OR 
MISUSE OF THE STIPULATION 
In an attempt to simplify the case and focus on an issue on which Questar 
and the Property Tax had material disagreement, the parties stipulated (1) that the 
nThe Division's own witness was emphatic about this: "So it is not a market 
based method of evaluation . . . ." (R. 125.) 
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overall FMV evaluation should be derived form the values obtained from the three 
"standard" evaluation methods (cost, stock-and-debt, and income) and (2) the 
values of the three methods and the accuracy of their derivations would not be at 
issue. (R. 380-81.)12 Thus, the framework agreed to by the parties was a sub-
stitute for the presentation of full, comprehensive appraisals13 by the parties. Ac-
cordingly, no witness sponsored a full appraisal, because the purpose of the evi-
dentiary proceeding was limited to the determination of a proper combination of 
the three values, i.e., the "correlation" of the stipulated values, to obtain Ques-
tar's FMV. The proceeding was thus abbreviated to issues involving the reliabili-
ty and propriety of the various methods in determining FMV. 
The Commission's Brief indicates a material misunderstanding or misuse of 
the stipulated facts and issues. For example, the brief (pages 37-38) criticizes 
Questar witness Prof. Heaton because he did not conduct a complete appraisal. 
But the stipulation obviated a complete appraisal, requiring all witnesses to start at 
a point far down the road from conducting a complete appraisal. Again, that was 
the point of the stipulation, and its operational effect was to provide a common 
starting point for each party and witness—one that did not involve a comprehen-
12A copy of the Stipulation of Facts and Issues is attached as Addendum A to 
this Reply Brief. 
13a
 Appraisal," as used in the Commission Brief, apparently refers to a com-
plete assembly of company data and information, the derivation of all the compo-
nents and application of appropriate methods of estimating FMV, and correlation 
or weighting of the results of the separate methods. 
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sive appraisal. No one conducted a complete appraisal that was part of the post-
stipulation proceedings and record. Certainly, Division witnesses Goodwin and 
Hanke did not conduct any appraisal. Their testimony was almost entirely theoret-
ical or advisory in nature, limited generally to commenting on the theory of the 
methods at issue. Nor did Mr. Prawitt sponsor an appraisal (even though he may 
have at one time performed one that produced different individual results than 
those stipulated to.) 
It is fundamentally inconsistent with the established facts in the case, i.e., 
the stipulation, to reject or minimize the import of Prof. Heaton's evidence on the 
basis of his not having performed a complete appraisal. An arm of the Commis-
sion (the Division) entered into a stipulation of issues that explicitly eliminated a 
portion of the potential issues. On brief, the Commission then explains that it 
rejected or accorded less weight to Prof. Heaton's evidence because he did not 
address issues that were stipulated to. This is grossly unfair to the witness and to 
the taxpayer. It is notable that the Commission (apparently) did not correspond-
ingly discount the evidence of Prof. Hanke and Mr. Goodwin; yet, they too 
conducted no appraisal. The Commission's logic on this point is not supportable. 
Prof. Heaton, as did Division witnesses, addressed the relative merits of the 
three component methods. His testimony and exhibits were, as the framework of 
the stipulation called for, based on an analytic method for determining the most 
reliable (i. e., the best) estimator of FMV. Although there may be other legitimate 
-18-
methods for addressing the problem, it is an abuse of agency discretion to discount 
or reject a witness's evidence on the basis of its mischaracterization of the process 
and of the witness's testimony. 
The Commission's summary dismissal of the only comprehensive, analytic 
attempt to solve the problem defined by the stipulation relies on a mischaracteriza-
tion of key evidence and its view that property tax determinations are an "art, not 
a science." This is arbitrary and capricious and not in compliance with the re-
quirements of Milne and Mountain States. 
On a similar point, it is contrary to the framework of the stipulation for the 
Commission to claim (page 25) that Questar agreed that the value of its property 
is as much as $300 million simply because those are the stipulated values of two 
of the methods. The parties did not concede the relative merits of the stipulated 
values. That was the entire point of the controversy. "[T]he parties do not . . . 
agree on the relative merits of the individual approaches." (R. 380, 1 1(b).) 
Thus, the Commission's logic, when applied to the Property Tax Division, would 
imply they agree that the value of the Company is as low as $210 million. 
V. THE COMMISSION'S BRIEF DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF THE STOCK-AND-DEBT 
METHOD FOR QUESTAR, VIS-A-VIS NORTHWEST PIPELINE 
At pages 19-25, the Commission Brief tries to justify why it has accorded 
materially different treatment of the stock-and-debt method to Northwest Pipeline 
Corporation (Northwest) and Questar. 
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The evidence in this case concerning the stock-and-debt method establishes 
beyond reasonable argument that a direct evaluation of Questar, as a second-level, 
minority subsidiary of a diversified parent, through the aggregate value of its 
common stock and debt is impossible. It is fiirther established that any attempt to 
assign a value to Questar by the stock-and-debt method will require an allocation 
of some percentage of the parent to the subsidiary or the attribution of characteris-
tics of other "comparable" companies to Questar. (See discussion and citations in 
Questar O.B. at 25-29.) 
The conclusion is inescapable that, on the facts in this record (and not for 
the hypothetical publicly traded company for which the stock-and-debt method 
may be effective), the stock-and-debt method is not a reliable indicator of FMV. 
It is not reliable because it is indirect and produces a wide range of potential 
values, as a function of the particular allocation factors or indices that are used. 
(R. 260-61.) 
Thus, the Commission's material reliance on the method as a "test" of 
another method is not based on the quality of evidence that would persuade a reas-
onable person who understood the rate-regulatory limitations placed on the earning 
value of Questar. On the merits under the facts of this case, the Commission's 
substantial reliance on the stock-and-debt method in the face of the fundamental 
role played by its FERC rate base in determining the earning power of Questar is 
not supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole is considered. 
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Further, the Commission's somewhat inscrutable treatment of the Northwest 
Pipeline Corporation case, as discussed in the Questar Opening Brief (pages 
27-29) and its Supplement to the Opening Brief, detracts further from any justifi-
able reliance on the stock-and-debt method. There is no dispute that the Com-
mission was mistaken when it claimed that the common stock of Northwest's 
parent, The Williams Companies, was not publicly traded. (Commission Brief at 
25.) But the Commission attempts to rationalize away its inexplicable error by 
arguing, in effect: So what if we didn't have the facts straight, the reasoning was 
OK. 
There are two major problems with the explanation in the Commission 
Brief. (1) How could the Commission not be aware of a factual matter that it 
claims is so vital to the analysis of the applicability of the stock-and-debt method 
to a major centrally assessed company?14 A partial answer is that the erroneous 
"the parent is not publicly traded" argument appears to be an afterthought to the 
Commission's rejection of the stock-and-debt method, not the primary evaluation. 
As pointed out in Questar's Initial Brief, the thrust of the analysis was that the 
allocations necessary to evaluate a company two subsidiary levels down rendered 
the method unreliable. The secondary (but incorrect) observation was given as 
further confirmation. Why else would the Commission begin this secondary point 
14This may also raise a question concerning the level of deference to be ac-
corded to an agency's expertise. 
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with "Further, there is no specific information available . . . ."?15 
(2) More fundamentally, the Commission's treatment of Questar produces 
the irreconcilable inequity that two extensive interstate pipelines with major opera-
tions and property in Utah and otherwise similarly situated are subjected to sub-
stantially different taxation treatment. This does not measure up to the standards 
of UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and (iii). The Commission's basis for the inconsis-
tency is not "fair and rational." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief, Questar believes that the 
Commission Brief has not established the lawfulness of the December 3, 1990, 
order, and seeks an order of the Court providing the relief sought in Questar's 
Opening Brief. 
15The full context from the Commission's order was: 
The parent corporation raises capital by the issuance of its own debt 
and that capital is then utilized in the business operations of the 
Williams Company [sic] and its several subsidiaries, including Peti-
tioner. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine what portion of 
the stock and debt of the Williams Company should be allocated to 
Petitioner. Further, there is no specific information available con-
cerning the market value of the non public stock. 
Questar O.B., Addendum C, at 6. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPA N S 
Gary G. Sackett, 
Associate General Counsel 
Questar Corporation 
180 East First South Street 
P.O. Box 11150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Counsel for 
Questar Pipeline Company, 
a Questar Corporation subsidiary 
ADDENDUM A 
^ - " . > • ' - > 
mmm. 
r 
BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF U T ^ A £ ^ ^ 
QUESTAR PIPEI I NE COMPA* 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respoi idei it. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
AND ISSUES 
Appeal No. 88-1456 
.:: vr.L- ;•::;; ,)\ narrowing the issues that have been raised in this proceeding, 
Questar Pip!, .ne Compam and :he Properft Tux Division of the State Tax Commis-
v -1 oi l"iah \"e Division) stipulate tu me iolluwnig facts and issues for purposes of 
. ^:' ' ;.v- parties st.puaOv/ oan ::.L oiree approaches to the total assessment 
of the Company's taxable property shall be those generally referred t as the .\ : 
method, the r^ome method and the market i or stock-and-debt) method. The partus 
further agree that these three approaches Yield ihe following estimates oi Questar 
Pipe 1 i i 1 i"s totz 1 syste i i :i • ira 11 I e f o i 1:1 ie t a xal11 e yc a i 1,lJXS, 
Cost Method $210,492,693 
Income Method $303,000,000 
Stock-and-Debt Method $312,321,375 
(b) Having stipulated to the amounts in § 1(a), the parties do not necessarily 
agree on the methods, assumptions or variables that were used to derive such \ alues, 
nor do they leree . •* f: e * * a* \- *ocra^ O\ ihe mdividual approaches, , . . , .*> 
1
 ill] n i l a l K i n if in i n \ • ^ . : " * } ' ; * • • " -* s ' .L^:S 
tu present anil pursue such positions, methods, approaches and arguments as it sees 
fit in an\ other proceeding. 
OOOOi ; . / i 
(c) In consideration of stipulating to a market indicator different from that 
stated in the Divisioi i"s /!\, ';», 1988, Notice of Assessment, tl le parties fort! ici agree 
tion ol market-value indicators that emphasizes or relies on the relative difference 
between the income and stock-and-debt methods to imply or conclude that the cost 
method is inferior r • . , > should be entitled to a smaller or greater con-
sidera: * ; . ,;,iv ,lH • does i not in ai :t) s* aj limit tl me i ight of eithei 
pa*". /* <: , ': . / : .. n i :\ ig the strength 01 weakness of the cost method 
on any other grounds or theory. 
T" .- pa:t::^ ajiee :!MI V * "tat: illocatior r Questar Pipeline's 
correlated system n r ^ ' ' ^ due \h<w\ >e 48.04%, ;o r Questar Pipeline's Utah 
, u h 
I )-
; ICV1 
::\ subjei: to r , lii;... determination o* the correlated marke: \ :.... • *? t 
property in tllis proceeding. 
3 'The sole issue to be litigated in this proceeding is the "correlation" ot the 
three values stipulated to in § 1 above, lionii which a single total-company assessed 
\aluation is i he determined, fuich party ma\ advance and pursue such evidence 
.: id argument as it deems appropriate (subject to § 1(c)) in establishing the method 
.* -\h the three stipulated values should be used to determine a single "c ai 
related" value. 
This M>pul u, r "s enteie.l into "his '29? day o1 Septemhei 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY 
a 
Assistant' Attorney* General 
State o f I hah 
/Gary G. Sackett 
U • Attorney for 
Questar Pipeline Company 
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